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Abstract—Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are stealthy
customized attacks by intelligent adversaries. This paper deals
with detection of APTs that infiltrate cyber systems and compro-
mise specifically targeted data and/or infrastructures. Dynamic
information flow tracking is an information trace-based detection
mechanism against APTs that taints suspicious information flows
in the system and generates security analysis for unauthorized
use of tainted data. In this paper, we develop an analytical model
for resource efficient detection of APTs using an information
flow tracking game. The game is a nonzero-sum, turn-based,
stochastic game with asymmetric information as the defender
cannot distinguish whether an incoming flow is malicious or
benign and hence has only partial state observation. We analyze
equilibrium of the game and prove that a Nash equilibrium is
given by a solution to the minimum capacity cut set problem on a
flow-network derived from the system, where the edge capacities
are obtained from the cost of performing security analysis.
Finally, we implement our algorithm on the real-world dataset
for a data exfiltration attack augmented with false-negative and
false-positive rates and compute an optimal defender strategy.
Index Terms—Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), Informa-
tion flow tracking, Stochastic games, Minimum-cut problem
I. INTRODUCTION
Advanced persistent threat (APT) is a prolonged and tar-
geted cyber attack in which an intruder gains illicit access to a
system and remains undetected for an extended period of time.
The intention of an APT is usually to monitor system activity
and continuously mine highly sensitive data rather than caus-
ing damage to the system or organization. APT attacks consist
of multiple stages that are initiated by an intial compromise
and reconnaissance stage to establish a foothold in the system.
Attackers then move laterally through the system, exploring
and planning the best attack strategy to obtain the desired
data, followed by data exfiltration which is continued for
long period of time until finally detected. Defending against
APTs is a challenging task as they are specifically designed
to evade conventional security mechanisms such as firewalls,
anti-virus software and intrusion-detection systems that rely
on signatures and can, therefore, guard only against known
threats. However, APTs introduce information flows in the
form of data-flow commands and control-flow commands
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while interacting with the system and these are continuously
recorded in the log file of the system.
Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT) [1] is a widely
accepted detection mechanism against APTs. DIFT uses the
information traces recorded in the system log for performing
the security analysis [2]. The key idea behind DIFT is that
it taints (tags) all suspicious input/data channels and tracks
the propagation of the tainted information flows through
the system. DIFT generates security analysis using a pre-
specified set of security rules (policies) whenever it observes
an unauthorized use of tainted data.
While the security policies incorporated in the DIFT mech-
anism cover a wide range of attacks, these security policies
may not be capable of verifying the authenticity of information
flows against all possible attacks resulting in the generation
of false-negatives and false-positives. For instance, while
the security rules for buffer overflow protection [3] can be
verified accurately, the security rules for web application
vulnerabilities [4] cannot be accurately verified. Consequently,
attacks that exploit web application vulnerabilities generate
false-positives and false-negatives.
Additionally, limited availability of resources for defense
along with the performance and memory overhead imposed
by the defense mechanism on the system demands a resource
efficient detection technique. An analytical model of DIFT and
its interaction with adversarial information flows would enable
evaluation of the effectiveness of flow-tainting mechanisms,
as well as the design of optimal security policies facilitating
resource efficient detection of APTs while taking into account
the generation of false-positives and false-negatives.
In this paper, we provide such an analytical model for DIFT
for optimal selection of locations in the system to perform
security analysis so as to maximize the probability of detection
while minimizing the cost of detection, false-positives, and
false-negatives. Our framework is based on the following
insights. First, the effectiveness of the defender depends on
the adversary’s strategy, while the adversary’s probability of
evading detection is determined by the defender’s strategy.
This strategic interaction motivates a game-theoretic approach.
Second, the efficiency of detection also depends on the effec-
tiveness of performing security analysis at different locations
in the system which is determined by rate of false-positives
and false-negatives. Hence the game model is stochastic in
nature and the transition probabilities are governed by the
false-positive and false-negative rates of the system. Third, the
game unfolds at multiple states between the entry points and
the exit points of the attack where each state corresponds to
the position of the tainted flows in the system. At each state,
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the defender decides whether to analyze a tagged flow and
which one of the tagged flows to analyze (to avoid generation
of false-positives and false-negatives) while the adversary
decides which process to transition to, at the cost of spending
the defense resources. We formulate a stochastic game model
that is played on an information flow graph that describes
the feasible transitions between processes in the system. The
contributions of this paper are the following.
• We model the interaction of the APT and the DIFT
with the system as a nonzero-sum, two-player, turn-based
stochastic game (G) with finite state and action spaces.
In the DIFT vs. APT game, the defender has only partial
state information since it cannot distinguish whether an
incoming tainted (suspicious) flow is malicious or benign.
• We analyze Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy of the game
and show that an NE can be obtained from a solution
to the minimum capacity cut-set problem on a flow-
network constructed from the information flow graph of
the system.
• We implement our algorithms and results on real-world
data obtained for data exfiltration attack using Refinable
Attack INvestigation (RAIN) system [2] and augmented
with false-positive and false-negative rates of the system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents related work. Section III introduces preliminary con-
cepts on information flow graph, APT attack, and a descrip-
tion of DIFT-based defense mechanism. Section IV describes
the formulation of the turn-based stochastic game model.
Section V gives the solution concept of the game and the
equilibrium analysis results for computing optimal strategies
of the players. Section VI illustrates the numerical results
using data exfiltration attack data set collected using RAIN
and augmented with false-negative and false-positive rates.
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Stochastic games model interactions of multiple agents that
jointly control the evolution of states of a stochastic dynamical
system [5]. Stochastic games are widely used to model secu-
rity games [6], economic games [7], and resilience of cyber-
physical systems [8], where each player tries to maximize its
individual payoff. A brief overview of the existing results in
stochastic games is given in [9].
A zero-sum two-player stochastic game with perfect infor-
mation structure is polynomial-time solvable [10]. However,
often information asymmetry arises due to incomplete state
observation and unavailability of actions of the other players.
The asymmetry of information structure among the players
makes it difficult to compute or characterize NE of the game.
Multi-player stochastic game with asymmetric information is
considered in [11] for a special information structure and finite
horizon. The approach in [11] used the common information
among the players of the asymmetric information game to
construct an equivalent symmetric information game such that
equilibria of the new game can be transformed to equilibria
of the original game. Reference [11] then proposed to use
dynamic programming algorithm to obtain optimal strategies.
The approach in [11] is extended to the case where players
have resource constraints in [12].
Stochastic games are used to address system security related
problems. The interaction between malicious attackers and the
intrusion detection system (IDS) is modeled using a stochastic
game in [13]. A nonzero-sum stochastic game model is given
in [14] to model network security configuration problem in
distributed IDS. Then a value iteration based algorithm is
proposed in [14] to find an ε-NE for an attacker model
where multiple adversaries simultaneously attack a network.
A zero-sum stochastic game is formulated in [15] for IDS in
a communication or computer network with interdependent
nodes and correlated security assets and vulnerabilities. Note
that, [11], [12], and [16] considered finite-horizon games and
[13]-[15] dealt with zero-sum stochastic games for IDS.
Game-theoretic models for resource-efficient detection of
APTs are given in [17], [18], [19], and [20]. DIFT models with
fixed taint sink (trap) locations are introduced and analyzed
in [17], [18]. Paper [19] extended the models in [17], [18]
by considering a DIFT model which selects the trap locations
in a dynamic manner rather than being fixed and proposed a
min-cut based solution approach. Reference [20] considered
the detection of APTs when the attack consists of multiple
attackers possibly with different capabilities and analyzed the
best responses of the players. Note that, the focus in [17], [18],
and [19] is resource efficient detection of APTs and they do
not consider the false-positives and false-negatives generated
in the system. In other words, the game models in [17]-
[20] assume that security analysis performed by DIFT can
verify the authenticity of tagged information flows accurately.
A stochastic game model for detecting APTs was recently
introduced in [21]. Paper [21] analyzed a discounted stochastic
game and presented a value iteration based algorithm to obtain
an ε-NE of the discounted game. In contrast to [21], this paper
solves an average reward (undiscounted) game.
In this paper we consider that the traps are generated
dynamically and we extend our previous results on min-cut
analysis in [19] in the following aspects. (i) We consider that
the security policies (rules) of DIFT may not be capable of
verifying the authenticity of the information flows accurately
thereby resulting in the generation of false-positives and false-
negatives, as there is a wide range of possible APT attacks.
Consequently, the game model in this paper is stochastic.
(ii) We introduce a model with multiple information flows
out of which one is malicious and the remaining are benign
unlike in [19] which dealt with one information flow. (iii) In
the current game model, although an information flow is
concluded as benign at an initial inspection, it can be inspected
again later during its propagation. The model in [19] inspects
the flow exactly once as false-negatives and false-positives
rates are assumed to be zero.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first describe the graphical representation
of the system, denoted as the information flow graph, and then
present the models of the attacker and the flow tracking-based
defense.
A. Information Flow Graph (IFG)
An IFG is a directed graph that expresses the history of
a system’s execution in terms of the spatio-temporal rela-
tionships between processes and subjects. Let G = (VG ,EG)
represents the IFG of the system. VG = {v1, . . . ,vN} consists
of the processes (e.g., an instance of a computer program),
files, and objects in the system and EG ⊆VG ×VG represents
the information flows (directed) in the system from one node
to the other. IFG-based auditing is heavily desired by large
enterprises and government agencies to detect APTs. We
perform our game-theoretic analysis on the IFG of the system
and use DIFT as the defense mechanism to detect APTs.
B. Attacker Model: Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs)
APTs are intelligent attackers with specific targets that
enter into the system exploiting the vulnerabilities. APTs
are characterized by their abilities to render existing security
mechanisms ineffective; for example, APT activities can blend
in with normal user and program activities to blindside intru-
sion detection systems. APTs can evade security protection
because existing mechanisms lack sufficient visibility into
user, program, and operating system activities to ascertain
the authenticity of an activity and the provenance of its
data. There are several challenges that must be addressed
when creating the attacker model for APTs. Unlike classical
malware, APT campaigns tend to involve multiple hosts,
multiple systems, and extend over a long period of time, up
to several months [22].
Let the set of possible entry points of the APT is denoted
as λ ⊂VG . During an attack, the goal of the APT is to capture
a subset of nodes of the IFG referred to as destinations and
denoted as D ⊂ VG . Here, λ ∩D = /0. Once a foothold is
established in the system, APT tries to elevate the privileges
and proceeds to the destinations through more internal com-
promises and performs data exfiltration at an ultra-low-rate.
In order to achieve this the APT performs operations in the
system to transition through the nodes in VG and arrive at
some node in D. In other words, the adversary (APT) selects
paths in the IFG and performs transitions along the paths to
reach the set D from the set λ .
C. Defender Model: Dynamic Information Flow Tracking
(DIFT)
The objective of the defender is to prevent any adversarial
information flow traversing to the destination nodes. DIFT
is a dynamic taint analysis based detection mechanism that
consists of three main components: (i) taint sources, (ii) taint
propagation rules, and (iii) taint sinks (traps). Taint sources are
processes and objects (files and network endpoints) in the sys-
tem that are considered as suspicious sources of information
by the system. All data originating from a tainted source is
labeled or tainted and DIFT tracks the propagation of a tainted
data through the system. Propagation of a tainted information
flow through the system results in tainting of more information
flows based on the taint propagation rules specified by the
DIFT [23]. Taint propagation rules are defined based on two
kinds of information flows in the system: explicit information
flows and implicit information flows [24].
During the execution of a program in the system, DIFT
keeps track of the tainted information flows and generates
taint sinks for any unauthorized use of tainted data that
indicate a possible attack. DIFT invokes security analysis at
the taint sinks using the specified security policies (rules) to
verify the authenticity of the tainted flow thereby concluding
whether there is an attack or not. These security rules are
pre-specified depending on the application running on the
system [3]. Note that tainted (suspicious) flows consist of
both benign and malicious flows. As the specified security
rules may not necessarily cover all possible attacks by APTs,
DIFT generates false-positives and false-negatives during the
security analysis. An optimal selection of taint sinks in the IFG
is hence critical to detect a wide range of attacks in the system
with minimum false-positives and false-negatives. Note that
while taint sources and taint propagation rules are known to
the attacker, the taint sinks are dynamically generated during
the operation of the system and hence is unknown to the
attacker.
IV. TURN-BASED APT VS. DIFT GAME G
In this section, we model the interaction of the APT with
the system during the different stages of the attack as a
dynamic stochastic game between the defender (DIFT) and
the adversary (APT). Let PD be the defender player and PA be
the adversarial player. We consider a nonzero-sum turn-based
game. The information structure of the players is asymmetric
as the defender player does not know if a tainted (suspicious)
flow is malicious or benign while the adversarial player knows
this information. The game G = {S,s0,Σ ,∆ ,P} unfolds on a
finite state space, S, with initial state, s0, finite action space of
players, Σ , labeled transitions ∆ ⊆ S×Σ ×S, and transition
probability matrix P.
A. State Space
We consider a turn-based game with the state of the game
at time t ∈ {0,1,2, . . .} denoted by the random variable st . Let
T denote the time horizon of the game, i.e., the game ends
at time T and st ′ = sT , for all t ′ > T . The state space S is
partitioned into two sets, SA and SD, such that SA∩SD = /0 and
SA∪SD = S. The states that belong to the set SA are referred
to as the adversary-controlled states and the states in SD are
referred to as the defender-controlled states. Specifically, Sx
is the subset of states at which player Px, where x ∈ {A,D},
controls the transitions. The state of the game at time t is the
state of the system which corresponds to the position of the
tainted (suspicious) flows at time t. Let W be the number of
tainted flows that arrive into the system at time t = 1. Here
W << N as the number of information flows in the system at
a particular time instant is itself much smaller than the size of
the IFG, i.e., N. This is because the IFG represents information
flow for the entire duration of a system’s execution, while the
information flows at a specific instant in time only represent
data flow related to a specific task. We denote the state of
the game at time t using the location of the W flows in the
system and one additional bit which represents whether that
state belong to SA or SD.
Specifically, at time t, st = (x,vi1 , . . . ,viW ), where
{vi1 , . . . ,viW } ∈ VF ∪ {φ ,τ} and x ∈ {A,D}. Here, x = A
implies that st ∈ SA and x=D implies that st ∈ SD. Moreover,
vik = φ if the k
th information flow drops out, and vik = τ if the
kth information flow is trapped by DIFT. The initial state of
the game at t = 0 is denoted as s0 = s0 = (A,sF , . . . ,sF), since
at t = 0 all flows originate at the source node sF . At time t > 1,
the state of the game is st = (x,vi1 , . . . ,viW ), where x ∈ {A,D}
and {vi1 , . . . ,viW } ∈ VG ∪ {φ ,τ}. Note that, that out of the
W flows one is a malicious flow and the remaining (W − 1)
are benign flows. For notational convenience we consider the
first flow is malicious (note that, defender does not have this
information). While DIFT observes all the W flows, it cannot
distinguish which is malicious and hence PD has only partial
information of the state of the game. The adversary, on the
other hand, has complete information of the state.
Also, corresponding to a state st if vik = φ , for some k ∈
{1, . . . ,W}, then for all time t ′ > t the state corresponding to
the kth flow remains φ , i.e., if a flow is dropped at time t it
remains dropped through out the rest of the game.
B. Action Spaces
We first construct a directed flow-network F = (VF ,EF )
from the IFG G by introducing a source node sF with an
outgoing edge to all the entry points and a sink node tF with
an incoming edge from all the destination nodes. Here VF =
VG ∪{sF , tF} and EF = EG ∪{sF ×λ}∪{D× tF}.
Definition IV.1. An attack path in the flow-network F is a
simple directed path1 from sF to tF . The set of attack paths in
F is denoted as ΩD .
The objective of the APT attacker is to capture a destination
node in set D. To achieve the same, APT chooses transitions
along a path from the set λ to the set D which translates into
an attack path in the flow-network F . Since APT is a stealthy
attacker, APT performs minimum amount of activities in the
system in order to avoid detection. Thus, there are no cycles
in the transition path of the APT through the IFG and hence
all ω ∈ΩD are simple directed paths.
At a state st , either PD or PA chooses an action from their
respective action sets denoted by AD and AA, depending on
whether st ∈ SD or st ∈ SA. If st ∈ SA, the adversary decides
whether to quit the attack by dropping the information flow
or to continue the attack. If the adversary decides not to quit
the attack, then it selects which neighboring node of the IFG
to transition from the current node so as to reach set D. In
other words, the adversary either drops the malicious flow or
performs a transition along a path in ΩD and hence AA :=
{φ}∪VG . Specifically, at state st =(A,vi1 , . . . ,viW ), where vi1 ∈
VG and vi1 /∈ D, AA(st) ∈ {φ} ∪N (vi1), where N (vi1) =
{v j ∈ VG : (vi1 ,v j) ∈ EG}. On the other hand, if st ∈ SD, the
action of the defender is to decide whether to trap an incoming
information flow or not, and hence AD := {0}∪VG , where 0
1A directed path is said to be a simple directed path if there are no cycles
or loops in the path.
represents not trapping any flow. Note that, the defender traps
at most one flow in a state as there is only malicious flow
and also it is not possible to trap the information flows at the
entry points of the attack, λ . Thus at state st =(D,vi1 , . . . ,viW ),AD(st) ∈ {0}∪{vik : vik /∈ λ ,k ∈ {1, . . . ,W}}.
A state st is said to be an absorbing state if AA(st) =
AD(st)= /0. In G a state st =(x,vi1 , . . . ,viW ), where x∈{A,D},
is absorbing if one of the three cases hold:
(i) vi1 ∈D ⊂VG ,
(ii) vik = τ for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,W}, and
(iii vik = φ for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,W}.
Case (i) corresponds to adversary reaching a destination,
case (ii) corresponds to some flow being trapped by the DIFT,
and case (iii) corresponds to all W flows dropping out.
C. State Transitions
Definition IV.2. Time t is said to be the termination time
of the game G if it satisfies one of the following condition:
(a) t = T and (b) the state of the game st = (x,vi1 , . . . ,viW ),
where x ∈ {A,D}, is an absorbing state.
At time t, where t is not the termination time, the game
proceeds as follows. At every non-terminating time instant
t > 0 some W number of tagged flows arrive at some W
distinct nodes in the IFG. Let the state of the game at t
be st = (D,vi1 , . . . ,viW ). Here {vi1 , . . . ,viW } are the nodes of
the IFG at which the flows arrive. The DIFT-based defense
mechanism observes the flows. The player PD now chooses
an action from the set AD(st) ∈ {0,vi1 , . . . ,viW }. At state st ,
there are three possibilities: (1) PD does not trap any flow,
(2) PD traps the malicious flow, and (3) PD traps a benign
flow. Based on the action chosen by PD, i.e., AD(st), the next
possible state of the game st+1 is defined. At st+1 PA has
two possibilities to choose from: (a) to quit the flow, φ and
(b) to transition to an out-neighbor of node vi1 , N (vi1), i.e.,AA(st+1) ∈ {φ}∪N (vi1). Based on the action of PA and the
distribution of the benign flows in the system, the next state
st+2 is arrived. At t +2, PD again chooses its action and the
game continues in a turn-based fashion. Note that the DIFT
will trap only one information flow at a time t as we consider
a single malicious flow in the system.
For case (1) the action of PD is AD(st) = 0, i.e., DIFT
does not trap any of the W information flows. Then the
next state of the game st+1 = (A,vi1 , . . . ,viW ). For case (2),PD chooses action AD(st) = vi1 and the next state of
the game is st+1 = (A,vi1 , . . . ,viW ) with probability FN
and st+1 = (A,τ,vi2 , . . . ,viW ) with probability 1− FN. For
case (3), the player PD chooses action AD(st) = vik , k 6= 1,
i.e., k ∈ {2, . . . ,W}. Then the next state of the game is
st+1 = (A,vi1 , . . . ,vik−1 ,τ,vik+1 , . . . ,viW ) with probability FP
and st+1 = (A,vi1 , . . . ,viW ) with probability 1−FP. Here, FN
and FP are the rate of false-negatives and false-positives in the
DIFT-architecture which are empirically computed. The values
of FP and FN depend on the security policies (rules) and vary
across the different DIFT-architectures and they determine the
transition probabilities P of the stochastic game. In order to
reduce false-positives and false-negatives in the system, the
security rules must be capable of identifying the behavior
st st+1 st+2
AD(st) AA(st+1)
Figure 1: Schematic diagram showing the turn-based game G. At
state st ∈ SD the defender player PD chooses an action and the game
transitions to the next state st+1. At time t+1, the adversarial player
PA observes the current state st+1 ∈ SA and then chooses an action
based on which the next state st+2 ∈ SD is defined. At t+2 PD again
chooses its action and the game continues.
and predicting the intend of information flows, i.e., determine
whether an unknown flow is indeed malicious, or whether it
is benign flow that is exhibiting malware-like behavior [25].
If t+1 is not a terminating time instant, then the adversarial
player PA chooses action AA(st+1) ∈ {φ} ∪N (vi1). The
remaining W −1 flows follow the benign flow distribution in
the system, which is computed empirically from the nominal
system operation and known. Let piB : vi ∈VG → [0,1]|N (vi)|+1
denote the benign flow distribution. If the action of PA is φ ,
then st+2 = (D,φ ,v j2 , . . . ,v jW ), where v j2 , . . . ,v jW depend on
the distribution piB. Here {v j2 , . . . ,v jW } ∈ {φ}∪VG . Note that a
benign flow can also drop out. Now PD chooses its action and
the game continues. To summarize, given st = (D,vi1 , . . . ,viW )
(w.p stands for with probability), state transitions and the
corresponding transition probabilities, given by P, are
st+1 =

(A,vi1 , . . . ,viW ), w.p 1, if AD(st) = 0,
(A,vi1 , . . . ,viW ), w.p FN, if AD(st) = vi1 ,
(A,τ, . . . ,viW ), w.p 1−FN, if AD(st) = vi1 ,
(A,vi1 , . . . ,viW ), w.p 1−FP, if AD(st) = vik ,k 6= 1
(A,vi1 , . . . ,τ, . . . ,viW ),w.p FP, if AD(st) = vik ,k 6= 1.
(1)
and
st+2 =
{
(D,v j1 , . . . ,v jW ), if AA(st+1) ∈N (vi1),
(D,φ ,v j2 , . . . ,v jW ), if AA(st+1) = φ .
(2)
A schematic diagram that illustrates the transitions in the
turn-based game G is given in Figure 1.
D. Strategies of the Players
A strategy (policy) is a rule that each player uses to
select actions at every step of the game. We consider mixed
(stochastic) and behavioral player policies. Since the policy is
mixed, at a state, PD and PA select an action from the action
set AD and AA, respectively, based on some probability distri-
bution. Further, since the policy is behavioral, the probability
distribution on the action set at a time instant t depends on
all the states traversed by the game and the actions taken by
the players until time t.
We denote the information available to the players PD and
PA at time t 6 T by Yt and Zt , respectively. Then
Yt := {s0,d0,s1,d1, . . . ,st−1,dt−1,st},
Zt := {s0,a0,s1,a1, . . . ,st−1,at−1,st}. (3)
We denote the set of all possible outcomes for Yt and Zt
at time t using Y? and Z?, respectively. A mixed policy of
player PD is given by pD : Y?→ [0,1]|AD| and of player PA is
given by pA :Z?→ [0,1]|AA|. Let the set of all mixed policies
of PD and PA for game G be PD and PA, respectively. Then a
policy pD ∈PD and pA ∈PA are said to be pure or deterministic
policy if all the entries of the vectors pD and pA, respectively,
belong to the set {0,1}.
E. Payoffs to the Players
The payoff functions of PD and PA are denoted by UD and
UA, respectively. UD consists of three components: (i) resource
cost CD(vi) < 0 for performing security analysis of a flow at
a node vi ∈ VG , (ii) penalty βD < 0 for adversary reaching a
destination node in D, and (iii) reward αD > 0 for detecting
the adversary. Similarly, UA consists of two components: (i) a
reward βA > 0 for reaching a destination node in the set D,
and (ii) penalty αA < 0 for getting detected by the defender.
Let the payoff of player Px at an absorbing state st be
denoted as cx(st), where x ∈ {A,D}, at a non-absorbing
defense-controlled state st with action dt as rD(st ,dt), and at a
non-absorbing adversary-controlled state st with action at as
rA(st ,at). At each state in the game, st at time t, where t < T
and st is a non-absorbing state, player chooses its action (dt
for st ∈ SD and at for st ∈ SA) and receives payoff rD(st ,dt)
and rA(st ,at), respectively, and the game transitions to a next
state st+1. This is continued until they reach an absorbing state
and incur cA(st) and cD(st), respectively, or the game arrives
at the horizon, i.e., t = T .
Then, rA(st ,at) = 0 for all st ,at and
cA(st) =

αA, st = (A,τ, . . . ,viW )
βA, st = (A,vi1 , . . . ,τ, . . . ,viW )
0, otherwise
cD(st) =

βD, st = (D,vi1 , . . . ,viW ),vi1 ∈D
αD, st = (A,τ, . . . ,viW )
0, otherwise
rD(st ,dt) =
{
0, dt = 0
CD(vik), dt = vik ,k ∈ {1, . . . ,W}.
As the initial state of the game is s0, for a strategy pair
(pD, pA) the expected payoffs of the players are
UA(pD, pA) = Es0,pA,pD
[
T
∑
t=0
(RAt )
]
and (4)
UD(pD, pA) = Es0,pA,pD
[
T
∑
t=0
(RDt )
]
, (5)
where Es0,pA,pD denotes the expectation with respect to s0, pA,
and pD and
Rxt =

rD(st ,dt), x = D, t < T
rA(st ,at), x = A, t < T
cx(st), t = T.
(6)
We incorporate the idea of maximizing the probability of
detection and minimizing the probability of adversary evading
detection using the terms pT and pR, respectively. Further, we
capture the false-positives generated in the system using the
term pFP. Note that, generation of false-positive implies that
the defender failed to capture the adversary and concluded a
benign flow is malicious. This means that the adversary will
attain the target as the malicious flow evaded detection. Given
a set of policies (pD, pA), where pD ∈ PD and pA ∈ PA, and
benign distribution piB, the payoff functions of the players can
be rewritten as
UD(pD, pA)=∑
s∈SD
∑
vi∈s
(
pD(vi)CD(vi)
)
+ pT αD +(pR + pFP)βD,(7)
UA(pD, pA)=
(
pT αA +(pR + pFP)βA
)
, (8)
where pT is the cumulative probability that the adversarial
flow is detected by the defender, pR is the cumulative proba-
bility that the adversarial flow reaches a destination, and pFP
is the cumulative probability that a benign flow is trapped by
the defender, i.e., false-positive. Note that pT , pR are functions
of pD and pA, and pFP is a function of pD and piB. Our focus is
to compute a limiting average equilibrium of the nonzero-sum
stochastic game.
V. COMPUTATION OF OPTIMAL STRATEGY
A. Solution Concept
In this subsection, we present the solution concept of the
game.
Definition V.1. Let pA : Z?→ [0,1]|AA| denote a strategy of
the adversary. Also let pD : Y?→ [0,1]|AD| denote a strategy
of the defender, i.e., the probability of performing security
analysis at a state. Then the best response of the defender is
given by
BR(pA) = arg max
pD∈PD
{UD(pD, pA)}.
Similarly, the best responses of the adversary are given by
BR(pD) = arg max
pA∈PA
{UA(pD, pA)}.
The best response of the defender is the set of trapping
strategies that maximize the payoff of the defender for a
given adversarial strategy and known benign flow distribution.
The best response of the adversary is a set of transition
strategies, for a given defender strategy and known benign
flow distribution, that maximizes the probability of adversary
reaching a destination node without getting detected.
Definition V.2. A pair of strategies (pD, pA) is said to be a
Nash equilibrium (NE) if
pD ∈ BR(pA) and pA ∈ BR(pD).
An NE is a pair of strategies such that no player can benefit
through unilateral deviation, i.e., by changing the strategy
while the other player keeps the strategy unchanged.
Lemma V.3. Consider the APT vs. DIFT game G =
{S,s0,Σ ,∆ ,P}. Let N be the number of nodes in the IFG
and W be the number of flows that arrive into the system at
time t = 1. Then |S|= O(NW ).
Proof. We prove the result by showing that |SA| = O(NW )
and |SD| = O(NW ). Consider an arbitrary state s =
(x,vi1 , . . . ,viW ) ∈ S \ s0, where x ∈ {A,D}. Here, vik ∈ VG ∪
{φ ,τ} for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,W}. All the W tagged flows arrive at
distinct nodes in the set VG of the IFG as a process or file in
the system receive exactly one information flow at a particular
time. Therefore, for a state s= (x,vi1 , . . . ,viW ), where vik ∈VG
for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,W}, ia 6= ib for a,b ∈ {1, . . . ,W}. Also, the
defender traps one tagged flow at a time and hence there is no
state s=(x,vi1 , . . . ,viW ) with via = vib = τ for a 6= b. Repetition
of vik ’s is possible only for states with φ . Hence s belongs to
one of the two types: (a) {s= (x,vi1 , . . . ,viW ) : vik ∈VG ∪{τ}}
and (b) {s = (x,vi1 , . . . ,viW ) : vik ∈VG ∪{φ} such that vik = φ
for at least some k ∈ {1, . . . ,W}}.
Case (a) corresponds to selecting W items from a set of
N + 1 items without any repetitions. The cardinality of this
set is
(N+1
W
)
= (N+1)!(W )!(N+1−W )! = O(N
W ). Case (b) corresponds
to states with one or more φ entries. Note that, here repetitions
are allowed only for φ . The cardinality of this set is
(N+1
W−1
)
+(N+1
W−2
)
+ . . .+
(N+1
2
)
+
(N+1
1
)
= O(NW−2). Additionally, there
is an initial state s0. From (a) and (b), the number of possible
cases for s is O(NW ). Since s = (x,vi1 , . . . ,viW ), where x ∈
{A,D}, we get |SA| = O(NW ) and |SD| = O(NW ). As S =
SA∪SD, we get |S|= O(NW ).
It is shown that there exists an NE for nonzero-sum dis-
counted stochastic games [26]. However, the existence of NE
for nonzero-sum undiscounted stochastic games is open when
the time horizon is infinite, i.e., T = ∞. In the result below
we prove the existence of NE for the game G. The existence
is shown by proving that time horizon is indeed finite for
G and then invoking the existence of NE for finite horizon
undiscounted games.
Proposition V.4. The time horizon of the APT vs. DIFT game
G is 2N, i.e., T = 2N.
Proof. The action set AA of the adversary player (APT) is to
choose a transition along an attack path of the flow-network F
(Definition IV.1) or to drop out at some point. Let ΩD denote
the set of attack paths in F . Consider an arbitrary attack path
ωˆ ∈ ΩD . Recall that ωˆ is a simple path as an APT due to
its stealthy behavior will not traverse in cycles through the
system. Hence the length of ωˆ is at most N, as ωˆ is a simple
directed path. Thus in any run of the game, the adversary can
take at most N transitions. As G is a turn-based game, we set
the time horizon of the game as 2N.
Proposition V.5. There exists a Nash equilibrium for the APT
vs. DIFT game G.
Proof. It is shown in [16] that there exists a Nash equilibrium
for a nonzero-sum stochastic game with asymmetric informa-
tion structure, under stochastic behavioral policies, when the
time horizon is finite. Proposition V.4 prove that the APT vs.
DIFT game will terminate in 2N number of steps. Further,
the behavioral strategy space is a subset of the strategy space
PA×PD. Hence by the result in [16], the proof follows.
B. Solution Approach
In this section, we compute an NE of the DIFT vs. APT
game G. Our approach is based on a minimum capacity
cut-set formulation on a flow-network constructed from the
information flow graph of the system. Consider the flow-
network F = (VF ,EF ), where VF = VG ∪{sF , tF} and EF =
EG ∪{sF ×λ}∪{D× tF}. Then, a cut of F is defined below.
Definition V.6. In a flow-network F with vertex set VF and
directed edge set EF , the cut induced by Sˆ ⊂VF is a subset of
edges κ(Sˆ) ⊆ EF such that for every (u,v) ∈ κ(Sˆ), |{u,v}∩
Sˆ |= 1. Further, given edge capacity vector cF : EF →R+, the
capacity of a cut κ(Sˆ), is defined as the sum of the capacities
of the edges in the cut, i.e., cF(κ(Sˆ)) = ∑e∈κ(Sˆ) cF(e).
The (source-sink)-min-cut problem aims to find a cut κ(Sˆ?)
of Sˆ? ⊂VF such that cF(κ(Sˆ?))6 cF(κ(Sˆ)) for any cut κ(Sˆ)
of Sˆ ⊂ VF satisfying sF ∈ Sˆ and tF /∈ Sˆ . The (source-sink)-
min-cut problem is well studied and there exist algorithms
to find a min-cut in time polynomial in |VF | and |EF | [27].
In our approach to compute NE, which is detailed later in
the section, we find a min-cut through nodes of the flow-
network instead of the edges. Hence we transform the node
version of the min-cut problem to an equivalent edge version.
For this, we introduce an edge corresponding to each node in
F except the source and sink nodes. The transformed flow-
network is denoted as F = (V F ,EF), where V F = VF ∪V ′G
and EF = E ′F ∪E ′G ∪Eλ ∪ED with V ′G = {v′1, . . . ,v′N}, E ′F =
{(v′i,v j) : (vi,v j)∈EG}, Eλ = {(sF ,vi) : vi ∈ λ}, ED = {(v′i, tF) :
vi ∈D}, and E ′G = {(vi,v′i) : i= 1, . . . ,N}. The capacity vector
associated with the edges in F is given by
cF(e) :=
{
CD(vi), e ∈ E ′G
∞, otherwise
(9)
Note that E ′G is a cut of F and ∑e∈E ′G cF(e)<∞. Hence any
minimum capacity cut in F corresponds to edges from the set
E ′G as the capacity of the remaining edges is ∞ as shown in
Eq. (9). Further, the capacity of an edge in set (vi,v′i) ∈ E ′G
corresponds to the cost of conducting the security analysis at
node vi. Thus a minimum capacity cut in F corresponds to a
cut node set of the IFG with minimum total cost of performing
security analysis.
Let κ(Sˆ?) denotes an optimal solution to the (source-sink)-
min-cut problem on F . Then κ(Sˆ?)⊆E ′G and cF(κ(Sˆ?))<∞.
The nodes corresponding to the min-cut is
Sˆ? := {vi : (vi,v′i) ∈ κ(Sˆ?)}. (10)
In the APT vs. DIFT game, the aim of the defender is to
optimally select taint sinks in the IFG such that no adversarial
flow reaches some node in D. In other words, defender ensures
that all adversarial flows that originate in node sF gets detected
before reaching node tF . In order to ensure security, the
defender must select as taint sink at least one node in all
possible paths from sF to tF . In the equilibrium analysis of
the game we prove that an optimal strategy of the defender is
indeed to select the min-cut nodes of the flow-network as taint
sinks. The objective of the adversary is to optimally choose
the transitions in such a way that the probability of reaching
tF is maximum. The adversary hence plans its transitions to
select an attack path with least probability of detection.
The result below proves that an NE of game G is repre-
sented by the nodes corresponding to a minimum capacity cut
in the flow-network F . Note that, the solution to the min-cut
problem may not be unique. Consequently, there may exist
multiple NE for the game G.
Theorem V.7. Every NE (pA, pD) of the APT vs. DIFT game
G satisfies the following properties:
1) The defender’s strategy pD selects all the nodes in Sˆ?
as taint sinks, where Sˆ? is a set of min-cut nodes of the
flow network F .
2) The adversary’s strategy pA chooses transitions such that
each attack path passes through exactly one node in the
set Sˆ?.
We prove Theorem V.7 by invoking the property that at NE
every player plays a best response against the other players
simultaneously. We first present prove the best response re-
sults, Lemma V.8, Lemma V.10, and Lemma V.11, and then
present the proof of Theorem V.7.
Lemma V.8 gives the best response of the adversary for a
given defender strategy that selects the min-cut nodes of F
as the taint sinks for analyzing the flows.
Lemma V.8. Let ΩD be the set of all attack paths in F .
Consider a defender strategy pD in which only the min-cut
nodes Sˆ? of the flow-network F are chosen as taint sinks with
nonzero probability. Then, the best response of the adversary,
BR(pD), is to choose the transitions in such a way that all
attack paths which has nonzero probability under BR(pD) pass
through exactly one node in Sˆ?.
Proof. Consider the payoff function of the adversary,
UA(pD, pA) = (pT αA + (pR + pFP)βA). Here, pT and pR are
functions of pD and pA. However, pFP depends only on pD
and piB. Thus for a given pD,piB, the probabilities pT and pR
vary depending on pA, however, pFP is a constant. We prove
the result using a contradiction argument. Suppose the best
response of PA is a strategy p′A such that there exists a path
ωˆ ∈ΩD that passes through two nodes, say vi,v j ∈ Sˆ? ⊂VG ,
and piA(ωˆ) 6= 0, where piA(ωˆ) is the probability of attack path
ωˆ under p′A. Note that Sˆ? is a min-cut and vi,v j ∈ Sˆ?. Further,
CD(vi) 6= 0 and CD(v j) 6= 0. Thus there exists at least one
directed path, say ωˆ ′, from vi to tF that does not pass through
any node in Sˆ? \ {vi}. Similarly, there exists at least one
directed path, say ωˆ ′′, from v j to tF that does not pass through
any node in Sˆ? \ {v j}. As per the given defender policy pD
the only taint sink in ωˆ ′, ωˆ ′′ is vi,v j, respectively. Thus there
exists a policy pA such that all paths in ΩD with nonzero
probability under pA pass through exactly one node in Sˆ? and
UA(pD, pA) > UA(pD, p′A) (since pFP remains same and pT is
higher and pR is lower under p′A when compared to the values
under strategy pA). This contradicts the assumption that p′A is
a best response and completes the proof.
Definition V.9. Let the set of paths induced in the state
space S by the attack paths ΩD in F be denoted as Ω .
Then the probability of selecting a path ω ∈ Ω , denoted by
pi(ω), is pi(ω) = piA(ω)piB(ω), where piA(ω) is the probability
with which an adversary chooses ω (product of the adversary
transition probabilities along path ω) and piB(ω) is the
probability of benign flows in ω under distribution piB.
The following result proves that, under certain conditions,
for a given adversary strategy the best response of the defender
is to select one node in every attack path as a taint sink.
Lemma V.10. Let ΩD be the set of attack paths in F ,
Ω be the set of paths in S induced by ΩD , and pA be a
given strategy of PA. For ω ∈ Ω , let ω(A) denote the set
of nodes in ω corresponding to the adversarial (malicious)
flow and ω(B) denote the set of nodes in ω corresponding
to the benign flows. Also, let p(ω) denote the probabil-
ity of detecting the adversary along path ω , i.e., p(ω) =[
1−∏vi∈ω(A)(1− pD(vi))
]
(1− FN). Also, let f (ω) denote
the probability of trapping a benign flow (false-positive),
i.e., f (ω) =
[
1−∏vi∈ω(B)(1− pD(vi))
]
FP. If the defender’s
strategy satisfies the following two conditions:
(a) p(ω) = p(ω ′), for all ω,ω ′ ∈Ω and
(b) f (ω) = f (ω ′), for all ω,ω ′ ∈Ω ,
then the best response of the defender, BR(pA), is to select
with nonzero probability exactly one node in every ωˆ ∈ ΩD
as taint sink.
Proof. Let pi(ω) denote the probability of a path ω ∈Ω under
the given strategy pA and benign distribution piB. For a path ω
in the state space S, ω(A) denotes the set of nodes in ω corre-
sponding to the adversarial (malicious) flow and ω(B) denotes
the set of nodes in ω corresponding to the benign flows. Let
p(ω) denote the probability of detecting the adversary along
path ω , i.e., p(ω)=
[
1−∏vi∈ω(A)(1− pD(vi))
]
(1−FN). Also,
let f (ω) denote the probability of trapping a benign flow, i.e.,
false-positive. Then f (ω) =
[
1−∏vi∈ω(B)(1− pD(vi))
]
FP.
The defender’s payoff
UD(pD, pA) = ∑
ω∈Ω
pi(ω)
[
p(ω)αD +(1− p(ω)+ f (ω))βD
]
+ ∑
ω∈Ω
(
∑
vi∈ω
pD(vi)CD(vi)
)
Given p(ω)’s and f (ω)’s are equal for all ω ∈Ω . Thus
UD(pD, pA) =
[
p(ω)(αD−βD)+(1+ f (ω))βD
](
∑
ω∈Ω
pi(ω)
)
+ ∑
ω∈Ω
(
∑
vi∈ω
pD(vi)CD(vi)
)
=
[
p(ω)αD+(1− p(ω)+ f (ω))βD
]
+ ∑
ω∈Ω
(
∑
vi∈ω
pD(vi)CD(vi)
)
(11)
Eq. (11) holds as ∑ω∈Ω pi(ω) = 1. Consider a defender
strategy pD in which exactly one node in every ωˆ ∈ ΩD is
chosen as the taint sink. Assume that the defender strategy is
modified to p′D such that more than one node in some path are
chosen as taint sinks. This variation updates the probabilities
of nodes in a set of paths in Ω . Note that, due to the constraints
on p(ω) and f (ω) (conditions (a) and (b)), the defender’s
probabilities (strategy) at two nodes in a path are dependent.
Hence for all paths ω ∈ Ω whose probabilities are modified
in p′D, ∑vi∈ω p
′
D(vi)CD(vi)< ∑vi∈ω pD(vi)CD(vi). This holds as
the probability in the single node case is less than the sum
of the probabilities of more than one node case as the events
are dependent and the sum of the values of CD(·)< 0 are also
minimum (since min-cut). This implies
∑
ω∈Ω
(
∑
vi∈VG
p′D(vi)CD(vi)
)
< ∑
ω∈Ω
(
∑
vi∈VG
pD(vi)CD(vi)
)
. (12)
From Eq. (11) and by conditions (a) and (b), we get
UD(p′D, pA)<UD(pD, pA). Therefore, p′D is not a best response
for the defender and no best response of the defender has more
than one node chosen as taint sink, if p(ω)’s and f (ω)’s are
equal for all ω ∈Ω .
The result below proves that if Lemma V.10 holds, then for
a given adversary strategy the best response of the defender
is to select the min-cut nodes of F as taint sinks.
Lemma V.11. Let ΩD be the set of attack paths in F . Assume
that the defender’s strategy satisfies conditions (a) and (b) in
Lemma V.10 for a given adversary strategy pA. Then the best
response of the defender, BR(pA), is to select with nonzero
probability a min-cut node set of the flow-network F as the
taint sinks.
Proof. Under conditions (a) and (b) in Lemma V.10, the best
response of the defender is to select one node in every attack
path as taint sink. Note that all attack paths in F pass through
some node in the min-cut node set Sˆ?. By selecting the
nodes in Sˆ? as taint sinks, all possible attack paths have
some nonzero probability of getting detected. We prove the
result using a contradiction argument. Suppose that the best
response of the defender is not to select the nodes in Sˆ? as
taint sinks. Then, there exists a subset of nodes Sˆ ⊂VG such
that ∑vi∈Sˆ CD(vi)< ∑v j∈Sˆ? CD(v j). Further, all possible attack
paths in F pass through some node in Sˆ . Then, Sˆ is a (source-
sink)-cut-set and let κ(Sˆ) := {(vi,v′i) : vi ∈ Sˆ}. Then, κ(Sˆ) is
a cut set and cF(κ(Sˆ))< cF(κ(Sˆ?)). This contradicts the fact
that κ(Sˆ?) is an optimal solution to the (source-sink)-min-cut
problem. Hence under Lemma V.10 the best response of the
defender is to select the nodes in Sˆ? as taint sinks.
Using Lemma V.8, Lemma V.10, and Lemma V.11, we
present below the proof of Theorem V.7.
Proof of Theorem V.7: Consider a defender’s strategy that se-
lects the min-cut nodes as the taint sinks. Then, by Lemma V.8
the best response of the adversary is to select transitions in
such a way that all attack paths with nonzero probability pass
through exactly one node in the min-cut. Further Let ΩD
be the set of attack paths in F and Ω be the set of paths
in S induced by ΩD . Lemma V.11 concludes that the best
response of the defender is to select the min-cut nodes of
F as taint sinks, provided the probability of detecting the
adversary and the probability of trapping a benign flow are
equal for all ω ∈ Ω . This implies that, if NE strategy pair
satisfy the conditions that p(ω)’s and f (ω)’s are equal for
all ω ∈Ω , then the defender’s strategy at NE is to select the
min-cut nodes as the taint sinks and the adversary’s strategy
is to choose an attack path such that it passes through exactly
one node in the min-cut node set. By Proposition V.5, there
exists an NE for G. Consequently, if p(ω)’s and f (ω)’s are
equal at NE, the proof follows.
Let (pA, pD) be an NE of G. Consider a unilateral deviation
in the policy of the adversary. Let pi(ω)’s for ω ∈ Ω are
modified due to change in transition probabilities of the adver-
sary such that the updated probabilities of the attack paths are
pi(ωi)+ εi, for i = 1, . . . , |Ω |. Here, εi’s can take positive val-
ues, negative values or zero such that ∑|Ω |i=1 εi = 0. Consider two
arbitrary paths, say ω1 ∈Ω and ω2 ∈Ω , such that a unilateral
change in the adversary policy changes pi(ω1) and pi(ω2) and
the probabilities of the other paths remain unchanged. Without
loss of generality, assume that pi(ω1) increases by ε while
pi(ω2) decreases by ε and all other pi(ω)’s remain the same.
As (pD, pA) is an NE, (pi(ω1) + ε)
(
p(ω1)(αA − βA) + βA +
f (ω1)βA
)
+(pi(ω2)− ε)
(
p(ω2)(αA−βA)+βA+ f (ω2)βA
)
6
pi(ω1)
(
p(ω1)(αA−βA)+βA+ f (ω1)βA
)
+pi(ω2)
(
p(ω2)(αA−
βA)+βA + f (ω2)βA
)
. Thus
(p(ω1)− p(ω2))(αA−βA)+( f (ω1)− f (ω2))βA 6 0. (13)
Now consider another unilateral deviation of adversary policy
such that pi(ω1) decreases by ε while pi(ω2) increases by ε
and all other pi(ω)’s remain the same. This gives
(p(ω1)− p(ω2))(αA−βA)+( f (ω1)− f (ω2))βA > 0. (14)
Eqs. (13) and (14) imply
(p(ω1)− p(ω2))(αA−βA)+( f (ω1)− f (ω2))βA = 0. (15)
Note that (αA−β A)< 0 and βA > 0. Therefore, there are three
possible cases where Eq. (15) holds.
(i) (p(ω1)− p(ω2))> 0 and ( f (ω1)− f (ω2))> 0,
(ii) (p(ω1)− p(ω2))< 0 and ( f (ω1)− f (ω2))< 0, and
(iii) (p(ω1)− p(ω2)) = 0 and ( f (ω1)− f (ω2)) = 0.
Consider case (i). For a path ω in the state space let ω(A)
denote the set of nodes in ω corresponding to the adversarial
flow and ω(B) denote the set of nodes in ω corresponding to
the benign flows. Rewriting(p(ω1)− p(ω2))> 0, we get([
1− ∏
vi∈ω1(A)
(1− pD(vi))
]
−
[
1− ∏
v j∈ω2(A)
(1− pD(v j))
])
(1−FN)> 0
(16)
Similarly rewriting( f (ω1)− f (ω2))> 0, we get([
1− ∏
vi∈ω1(B)
(1− pD(vi))
]
−
[
1− ∏
v j∈ω2(B)
(1− pD(v j))
])
FP > 0
(17)
As 0 < FP < 1 and 0 < FN < 1, Eqs. (16) and (17) imply[
∏
vi∈ω2(A)
(1− pD(vi))− ∏
v j∈ω1(A)
(1− pD(vi))
]
> 0 (18)[
∏
vi∈ω2(B)
(1− pD(vi))− ∏
v j∈ω1(B)
(1− pD(v j))
]
> 0 (19)
Eqs. (18) and (19) imply
∏
vi∈ω2(A)
(1− pD(vi)) > ∏
v j∈ω1(A)
(1− pD(vi)) and (20)
∏
vi∈ω2(B)
(1− pD(vi)) > ∏
v j∈ω1(B)
(1− pD(v j)) (21)
Note that at every state in s ∈ S with s = {vi1 , . . . ,vik} 0 6
∑vik∈s pD(vik)6 1. Thus Eqs. (20) and (21) cannot be together
satisfied. Thus case (i) does not hold at an NE. Following
the similar arguments one can show that case (ii) also does
not hold at an NE. This implies (p(ω1)− p(ω2)) = 0 and
( f (ω1)− f (ω2)) = 0.
Since ω1 and ω2 are arbitrary, one can show that for the
general case
|Ω |
∑
i=1
εi p(ωi) = 0 and
|Ω |
∑
i=1
εi f (ωi) = 0. (22)
Eq. (22) should hold for all possible values of εi’s satisfying
∑|Ω |i=1 εi = 0. This gives p(ωi) = p(ω j) and f (ωi) = f (ω j), for
all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , |Ω |}, at NE. This completes the proof.
Theorem V.7 concludes that the set of all solutions to the
min-cut problem characterizes the set of NE of game G. Two
key properties of an equilibrium strategy pair is that defender
chooses the min-cut nodes as taint sinks and indeed with equal
probability, which is proved in Lemma V.12.
Lemma V.12. Consider the APT vs. DIFT game G and let
(pA, pD) be an NE of G. Then under pD all the min-cut nodes
of the flow-network have equal probability of selecting as a
taint sink.
Proof. At NE, all the paths in the state space have equal
probability of getting detected, i.e., p(ω)’s are same for all
ω ∈ Ω (by Theorem V.7). For a path ω ∈ Ω with ω(A)
denoting the set of nodes corresponding to the adversarial
flow, we know
p(ω) =
[
1− ∏
vi∈ω(A)
(1− pD(vi))
]
(1−FN), for all ω ∈Ω .
(23)
Also, there is exactly one node corresponding to an attack
path that has nonzero probability of selecting as a taint sink
(Theorem V.7). Hence in set ω(A) exactly one node, say vi ∈
ω(A), has nonzero value of pD. Eq. (23) hence implies that
at NE all the min-cut nodes of the flow-network have equal
probability of selecting as a taint sink.
As a consequence of Theorem V.7 and Lemma V.12, the
following corollary holds.
Corollary V.13. Let Sˆ? be a set of min-cut nodes of the flow-
network F . Then, at an NE of the game G, the defender’s
strategy is to choose all the nodes in Sˆ? as taint sinks with
equal probability and the adversary’s strategy is to choose
transitions in such a way that each attack path passes through
exactly one node in Sˆ?.
Proof. By Theorem V.7 and Lemma V.12 the defender’s
strategy at NE is to select min-cut nodes as taint sinks with
equal probability. We know adversary’s payoff
UA(pD, pA) = ∑
ω∈Ω
pi(ω)
[
p(ω)αA +(1− p(ω)+ f (ω))βA
]
,
and at NE p(ω)’s and f (ω)’s are equal for all ω ∈Ω . Thus
the adversary’s optimal strategy is to select any path (or set
of paths if mixed) that passes through exactly one min-cut
node.
Using Theorem V.7 and Corollary V.13 we present below
an approach to compute an equilibrium strategy pair of G.
Firstly, we solve the node version of the (source-sink)-min-
cut problem on F . Let an optimal solution be κ(Sˆ?) and
the corresponding vertex set be Sˆ? = {v˜1, . . . , v˜r}, where
Sˆ? := {vi : (vi,v′i) ∈ κ(Sˆ?)}. By Theorem V.7, at NE the
defender only selects the nodes in Sˆ? as taint sinks, with equal
probability, and the adversary chooses transitions such that
each attack path passes through only one node in Sˆ?. There-
fore, the attack paths chosen by the adversary is characterized
by the nodes in Sˆ?. The set of paths in the state space S can
also be characterized by the nodes in Sˆ?. In other words, the
set of paths in the set Ω can be grouped such that each group
corresponds to a set of paths in Ω in which attack path (not
necessarily benign flows) passes through exactly one node in
Sˆ?, i.e., at least one among the W tainted flows passes through
exactly one min-cut node. We denote the set of paths in Ω
that correspond to node v˜i ∈ Sˆ? as Ω(v˜i). By Corollary V.13
any distribution over paths in Ω(v˜i), for i ∈ {1, . . . ,r} is an
optimal strategy for PA.
Remark V.14. At NE, all attack paths in F with nonzero
probability pass through exactly one node in the min-cut node
set Sˆ? = {v˜1, . . . , v˜r}. Further, the probabilities of selecting
them as taint sinks are also equal (since p(ω)’s are equal).
Thus, without loss of generality, one can characterize the
action space of the adversary as the set of attack paths in
F that pass through Sˆ?, disjoint with respect to nodes in Sˆ?,
and the adversary strategizes over this set of paths.
In the theorem below, we derive a closed-form expression
for the optimal defender strategy for the game G.
Theorem V.15. Consider the APT vs. DIFT game G. At
NE the defender selects all the min-cut nodes as taint sinks
with probability
1
min{W,r} , where W,r respectively denote
the number of tainted flows at a time in the system and the
cardinality of the min-cut nodes.
Proof. Consider a non-terminal state s ∈ S, where s =
{vi1 , . . . ,viW }. The action set of PD at s is AD(s) = {0} ∪
{vi1 , . . . ,viW }, for{vi1 , . . . ,viW } ⊂ VG . Any defender strategy
must satisfy for all s ∈ S, pD(0)+∑Wj=1 pD(vi j) = 1 if vi j 6= φ .
By Corollary V.13, at NE, PD only selects min-cut nodes as
taint sinks. Let Sˆ? = {v˜1, . . . , v˜r} be the solution obtained for
the min-cut problem. Thus the constraint on pD (that it should
add upto 1 at all states) boils down to the following. For all
states s = {vi1 , . . . ,viW } ⊆ {v˜1, . . . , v˜r},
pD(0)+ ∑
vi j :vi j∈{v˜1,...,v˜r}
j∈{1,...,W}
pD(vi j) = 1, (24)
Moreover, we know all min-cut nodes are chosen as taint sinks
with equal probability (Corollary V.13), i.e., pD(v˜1) = . . . =
pD(v˜r) := θ . For all states s = {vi1 , . . . ,viW } ⊆ {v˜1, . . . , v˜r}
pD(0)+θ
(
∑
vi j :vi j∈{v˜1,...,v˜r}
j∈{1,...,W}
1
)
= 1, (25)
For all states s ∈ S with s = {vi1 , . . . ,viW } ⊆ {v˜1, . . . , v˜r},
∑
vi j :vi j∈{v˜1,...,v˜r}
j∈{1,...,W}
16min{W,r}. (26)
Eq. (26) must hold for all states and hence the maximum value
that θ can take is when pD(0) = 0 and ∑vi j :vi j∈{v˜1,...,v˜r}
j∈{1,...,W}
1 =
min{W,r} at a state s ∈ S. Thus θ = 1
min{W,r} .
As the defender’s and adversary’s action sets are character-
ized by the min-cut nodes, the defender’s payoff is
UD(pD, pA) =
r
∑
i=1
∑
ω∈Ω(v˜i)
pi(ω)
[
p(ω)αD +(1− p(ω)+ f (ω))βD
]
+
r
∑
i=1
∑
ω∈Ω(v˜i)
(
∑
v˜i∈ω
pD(v˜i)CD(v˜i)
)
=
r
∑
i=1
∑
ω∈Ω(v˜i)
pi(ω)
[
θ(1−FN)(αD−βD)+βD + f (ω)βD
]
+
r
∑
i=1
∑
ω∈Ω(v˜i)
(
∑
v˜i∈ω
θCD(v˜i)
)
(27)
Eq. (27) holds from Lemma V.12 by substituting p(ω) =
[1−∏v˜i∈ω(A)(1− pD(v˜i))](1−FN) = (1−(1−θ))(1−FN) =
θ(1−FN). Here 06 θ(1−FN)6 1 and 06 f (ω)6 1. Also,
(αD − βD) >> βD with (αD − βD) >> 1 and βD < 0. Also
note that any distribution, pi(ω), over paths in Ω(v˜i), for
i ∈ {1, . . . ,r}, is optimal for adversary (Corollary V.13). Thus
Eq. (27) is maximum for the maximum possible θ . Hence at
NE the defender selects a set of min-cut nodes as taint sinks
with probability 1/min{W,r}.
This completes the discussion on the NE analysis of the
flow tracking game.
VI. NUMERICAL STUDY
We validate our theoretical results using real-world attack
data obtained using RAIN [2] for a data exfiltration attack. A
brief description of the dataset used and the steps involved in
the construction of the IFG for that attack is given below.
The goal of the attack is to exfiltrate sensitive information
from the system. The attack uses stolen credentials to exfiltrate
sensitive files from the targeted machine. The attack exfiltrates
sensitive system files using scp. The resulting IFG of the
data consists of 299 nodes and 6398 edges. Figure 4 shows
a portion of the IFG, obtained after performing a pruning
technique, that captures all possible attack paths in the IFG.
Entry points of the attack are identified as /bin/bash and
/usr/sbin/sshd (marked in green color in Figure 4). Destination
node of the attack is /etc/passwd (marked in black color in
Figure 4).
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Figure 2: The parameters chosen are: αA = −1000, βA = 1000, αD = 1000, βA = −1000. The resource cost for the nodes are chosen
such that CD(vi) is proportional to the total number of information flows at node vi for the whole logging period, where i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}.
Figures 2 (a) and 2 (b) shows the payoffs of the defender and adversary, respectively, for different values of false-positives (FP) and false-
negatives (FN) when min-cut nodes are chosen as taint sinks. The probability of selecting a min-cut nodes as taint sink is varied from
θ = 1/min{W,r}= 1/min{3,2}= 0.5, θ = 0.4 and θ = 0.2 for all the experiments. Also, each case is averaged over 1000 runs.
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Figure 3: The parameters chosen are: αA =−1000, βA = 1000, αD = 1000, βA =−1000. The resource cost for the nodes are chosen such that
CD(vi) is proportional to the total number of information flows at node vi for the whole logging period, where i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}. Figures 3 (a)
and 3 (b) shows the payoffs of the defender and adversary, respectively, for different values of false-positives (FP) and false-negatives (FN)
when (i) min-cut nodes are chosen as taint sinks, (ii) cut nodes (not min-cut), and (iii) nodes that are not a cut. Also, each case is averaged
over 1000 runs.
Figure 4: Portion of the IFG that captures all attack paths in IFG.
First we solve the min-cut problem on the flow-network
constructed from the IFG of the data. Resulting min-cut nodes,
/usr/bin/sudo and /run/consolekit/data, are indicated in red
color in Figure 4. The min-cut nodes are chosen as taint sinks
with probability θ = 1/min{W,r}. W and r denote the number
of tainted flows at a time in the system and the cardinality
of the obtained solution to the min-cut problem, respectively.
Here W = 3 and r = 2. Thus θ = 0.5.
Then we simulate an attack in the IFG and perform security
analysis to evaluate the performance of the DIFT model.
We conduct two experiments which are detailed below. Each
payoff value represented in Figure 2 and Figure 3 are obtained
after averaging over 1000 trials. We have identified 13 distinct
attack paths related to the adversary in the underlying IFG and
uniformly picked one attack path in each trial. Each of these
attack paths consist only one min-cut node (Theorem V.7).
Further, we set αA = −1000, βA = 1000, αD = 1000, and
βA = −1000. CD(vi) values are set to be proportional to the
number of information flows passing through each node, vi
for i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, in the IFG through out the logging period.
A. Case Study 1
In this experiment setup, we vary the probability of se-
lecting min-cut nodes as taint sinks. Recall that any prob-
ability greater than θ is not a valid defender’s strategy
(Theorem V.15). Hence for comparing the performance we
select probabilities θ 6 1/min{W,r} = 0.5. Note that at NE
θ = 0.5. Figures 2 (a) and 2 (b) plot the payoff values for both
players averaged over 1000 trials for different values of false-
positives and false-negatives. Figure 2 (a) shows that defender
performs better when following NE strategy, i.e., θ = 0.5,
which validates the theoretical analysis.
B. Case Study 2
In this case study we compare the performance of the
DIFT by varying the locations of taint sinks. The three cases
considered are: (i) min-cut nodes as taint sinks, (ii) cut nodes
(not a min-cut) as taint sinks, and (iii) nodes that are not a cut
as taint sinks. Figures 3 (a) and 3 (b) show that the expected
payoff of the defender takes higher values when the min-cut
nodes are chosen as the taint sinks. Also note that choosing
a cut is better than selecting set of nodes that are not a cut.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper provided a game-theoretic model for the detec-
tion of Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) using Dynamic
Information Flow Tracking (DIFT). The interaction of the
APT and the DIFT is modeled as a stochastic game in which
the defender chooses taint sinks to perform security analysis
and the adversary chooses attack paths that maximize the
probability of reaching the desired target. The defender is
unable to distinguish whether a tainted information flow at a
node in the information flow graph is malicious or not and
this resulted in the information asymmetry of the players.
Further, the defender is not accurate in its detection process
which results in the generation of false-positives and false-
negatives. We first modeled the strategic interactions between
DIFT and APT as a nonzero-sum, turn-based stochastic game.
The game captures the information asymmetry among the
players along with false-positives and false-negatives of DIFT.
Then we provided an approach to compute a Nash equilibrium
of the game, using a minimum capacity cut-set formulation.
Finally, we implemented our algorithm on real-world data
for a data exfiltration attack obtained using Refinable Attack
INvestigation (RAIN) system.
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